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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
EARNEST CHARLES FORD, : District Court No. 061900460 FS 
Defendant/Appellant : Appellate Court No. 20061165 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated November 24, 2006. 
The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of Attempted Murder with Injury, a 
first degree felony, and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a second degree felony. He was sentenced to serve a term of five years 
to life and one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The two sentences were 
ordered to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to any other sentences 
the Defendant was serving. The Defendant was ordered to serve an additional 
one-year consecutive on a gun enhancement. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS TRIAL COUNSEL 
DIDN'T FILE A MOTION TO SEVER THE POSSESSION OF A 
WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON CHARGE? 
Standard of Review: Normally the decision to not sever charges is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. "A ruling on a motion to sever charges 
under Rule 9 is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 740 (1985) However, the Defendant's attorney did not raise this issue with 
the trial court. Therefore, it should be reviewed under an ineffective assistance 
of counsel and plain error standard of review. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, 
which was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 687. 
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"[T]o establish the existence of plain error, and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show 
n»: i :U H J \ L b e d " ! n P \ ;•:>.:** {:• ; h • 
»bs-.*n? t1-,,- r\T[K mere is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ."' :' State v. 
Dunn 850P.2d 120!, 1208 (Utah 1993) 
CONS! I l l II IONA L I >RO\ ISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES . 
UNITED S I AT E S CONSTITUTION . . . 
SIXTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him: to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor and :<- ^-w* th- Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-3-203, Felony conviction. — Indeterminate term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a KMUI; -.; .v ~v;nv:>ce^ 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provide 
otherwise, for a term of noi less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years. 
liic ioiiovMn.u. in an error exi^is, \\\) inc C-:;G. 
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(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
§76-5-203. Murder 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
§76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership 
of dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under his 
custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is 
afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony 
offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct or 
in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or otherwise 
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
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(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both 
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, 
could have been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single 
indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution ^ prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder 
for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice 
requires. 
(b) A defendant's right 10 severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the 
motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion b\ 
defendant for severance, the court ma\ order the prosecutor k: dibdose an\ 
statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence ;;i 
the trial. 
§78-2a-3. CYntirl of Appeals jurisdiction... 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court, of Appeals from the Supreme (_ ou^t 
UTAH RULES OF iXiDLNCE 
Rule 404, i ftarijcfer evidence not admissible5 . ;•:••. * c a-ml::!^ ^cepiio/.v. 
other crimes. 
ia) Characici CUU^-MCC general!), fxidenee oS a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpo^- =,r proving action in conformity 
therewith -n n particular occasion, except: 
(i i Character oi* accused. Evidence of a pertinent trail o\ character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trail oi 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered, by the prosecution; 
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(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was initially charged with Attempted murder with injury, 
a first-degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-203(2)(a) (R. 004) The case 
was eventually set for trial on September 25, 2006. Prior to trial, the State filed 
an amended information. The amended information added the charge of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503(2)(a) There was also a dangerous 
weapon penalty enhancement added, in violation of U.C.A. §76-3-203. (R. 073) 
A preliminary hearing was held on the amended information on 
September 6, 2006. The Defendant was bound over on the amended charges. 
6 
(R. 078-79) Defendant's attorney did not file a motion to sever the charges or 
object to the charges being tried together. A jury trial was held September 26-
28, 2006. The Defendant was convicted of all counts. He was sentenced on 
November 22, 2006. The Defendant was sentenced to two indeterminate terms 
of five years to life and one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. These 
sentences were run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to another sentence 
the Defendant was serving. The dangerous weapon enhancement was ordered to 
run consecutive. (R. 148-49) The final order was signed on November 24, 
2006. (R. 148-49) A timely notice of appeal was filed on December 21, 2006. 
(R. 151) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 25, 2006, the victim, Felicia Chavez ("Chavez") and the 
Defendant were together at the Defendant's residence using crack cocaine 
together. (R. 163/99-102) The victim was very high. (R. 163/102) After they 
finished getting high they picked up some Chinese food and then returned to the 
Defendant's residence. (R. 163/102) After they finished eating they began 
drinking tequila. (R. 163/103) 
After they finished drinking the tequila, Chavez wanted to smoke some 
more crack. She testified that the Defendant wouldn't give her any unless she 
put her lips to his lips and did what is called a "shotgun." (R. 163/103-04) She 
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testified that when she wouldn't do that he "freaked out" and called her 
derogatory names. (R. 163/104) She responded in similar fashion and told him 
that she could have someone hurt him. (R. 163/104-05) She testified that he got 
up off the bed and came at her, and she shoved him. He hit the bed and then the 
floor. (R. 163/105-06) Chavez testified that they then fought, that he hit her and 
she hit him. He was on the ground and grabbed her by the foot. She kicked him 
andleft (R. 163/106) 
Chavez went to her cousin Ed Martin's house. (R. 163/107) While 
Chavez was at her cousin's house the Defendant came over. Chavez saw him 
standing by her with a gun, and he shot her. (R. 163/107) The Defendant fired 
three shots. Chavez realized that she had been hit and went inside the house and 
collapsed. (R. 163/108) She was in the hospital for three and a half months. At 
the time of trial she had had nine surgeries and still had two more scheduled. 
(R. 163/109) 
Chavez's cousin, Ed Martin, testified that on January 25, 2006, the 
Defendant went to his house and told his cousin to stay away from him or he 
"would shoot her punk ass." (R. 163/125) Chavez wasn't present at the time. 
Ed told the Defendant that if he saw her he would relay the message. (R. 
163/126) 
8 
Later that night, Ed heard a truck come up his driveway and the horn 
honked. Chavez was with Ed and another cousin at that time. Approximately 
three or four minutes prior to the horn honking, Chavez had knocked on Ed's 
door and asked to be let in. (R. 163/127) She told Ed that the Defendant had 
attempted to rape her and grab her breasts, and that she hit him and ran around 
the corner. She asked Ed to go back with her and retaliate. (R. 163/127) 
Ed told Chavez to stay in the house, and he went outside when he heard 
the horn honk. (R. 163/130-31) Ed noticed the Defendant's truck in his 
driveway. As Ed approached the truck he observed that the door was open. (R. 
163/131) The Defendant was inside the truck. (R. 163/132) The Defendant 
asked Ed where his "punk-assed cousin" was. (R. 163/132) 
Ed heard a click sound, which he recognized as a gun. He saw Chavez in 
his peripheral vision. He pushed her, and she bounced off the truck and into the 
line of fire as the shots went off. (R. 163/133) After the shots were fired the 
Defendant asked Ed to go talk to him. (R. 163/136) Ed did not respond to the 
Defendant's request, so the Defendant backed his truck out of the driveway and 
drove away. (R. 163/136-37) 
Ed Martin acknowledged that he gave the police officers a statement that 
was factually different from his in-court testimony. (R. 163/142) In Ed 
Martin's first statement on the night of the shooting he told the officers that he 
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wasn't at the house when the shooting happened. He said that he'd arrived later 
and noticed the truck in the driveway and the shots going off. (R. 163/142) 
In his second statement the day after the shooting he told an officer that he 
was home when Chavez came over and that she told him that the Defendant had 
"a lot of money and stuff and asked him to go back there with her. (R. 
163/146) Ed also said that she brought in some coins and pill bottles that she 
put on the couch before the Defendant arrived at his house. (R. 163/146) The 
pill bottles were later collected by law enforcement, and they belonged to the 
Defendant. (R. 163/61) 
The Defendant was taken into custody and interviewed the night of the 
shooting. He told Officer Blaine Clifford of the Ogden Police Department that 
Chavez had been at his house eating Chinese food and she "rolled" him. (R. 
163/184) The Defendant said that he then went over to Ed Martin's house to 
confront her. (R. 163/184) He said that while he was sitting in his truck they 
came out and assaulted him. (R. 163/185) The Defendant initially denied 
shooting anyone. Officer Clifford testified that he told the Defendant that 
Chavez was still alive, and the Defendant seemed disappointed. (R. 163/186) 
Dr. Richard Alder from McKay Dee Hospital testified that he treated 
Chavez, and she was critically injured due to a gunshot wound to the lower part 
of her right chest. (R. 164/5-6) 
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Officer Breen of the Ogden Police Department knew that the Defendant 
was on parole at the time so he contacted Jeff Moore, the Defendant's parole 
officer, and informed him of the situation. (R. 164/23-24) Officer Breen met 
with at least two parole officers who advised him they had the right to enter the 
Defendant's home. (R. 164/24) Several officers then went to the Defendant's 
home. They knocked on the door, and Defendant asked who it was. When he 
was told that it was Adult Probation and Parole he didn't answer the door. (R. 
164/24-27) The agents started to kick the door in, and the Defendant eventually 
answered the door. (R. 164/27) After Defendant was handcuffed he was 
interviewed by Officer Breen. The Defendant told him that Chavez robbed him, 
and he was tired of being taken advantage of. (R. 264/29) The Defendant said 
that he went over to tell her that it wasn't going to happen again and that he was 
punched in the face. (R. 264/30) 
The Defendant also stated that earlier in the night he had to change his 
oxygen tank and that when he bent over to change the tank, Chavez reached in 
his pocket, took money out of his pocket, and then ran up the stairs taking his 
coat that had the keys to his car in and left his residence. (R. 264/32) Officer 
Breen asked the Defendant how he got to Ed Martin's house because Officer 
Breen knew that the vehicle keys were missing, and the Defendant's car was in 
his driveway. The Defendant answered that he went in a truck. (R. 264/33) 
11 
He was asked where the truck was, and he answered that his best friend 
Roy had it. (R. 264/33-34) The Defendant was also asked about the gun. The 
Defendant answered that he didn't know about a gun. Eventually the Defendant 
told the officer that the gun was probably in Willard. (R. 264/34-35) 
The Defendant's parole officer Jeff Moore testified during the trial. Jeff 
Moore testified that the Defendant was on parole and the term "parole" means 
that "they're coming out of prison a convicted felon, and they have terms set by 
the Board of Pardons they have to comply with." (R. 264/72) 
Detective Thomas from the Ogden Police Department interviewed the 
Defendant. The Defendant told the detective that Chavez had tried to "roll 
him," that they argued, she took his cell phone and coat and ran out of the house. 
(R. 264/99) She also took seventy-five dollars and a bottle of scotch. (R. 
264/111) These items were all found at Ed Martin's house. (R. 264/116-19) 
The Defendant got in his truck and went looking for her. (R. 264/100) The 
Defendant said that he took a revolver with him when he went to her cousin Ed 
Martin's house. (R. 264/100) When he arrived he called for Ed to come 
outside. (R. 264/100) He told Ed to get Chavez so he could get his stuff back. 
(R. 264/101) 
He said that while they were talking Chavez came out of the house and 
was calling him a punk. (R. 264/101) He said that she tried to hit him. He 
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reached under the seat and pulled out the revolver. He said that everything got 
quiet and he couldn't recall what happened after he grabbed the revolver from 
under the seat. (R. 264/101) The Defendant said that it was possible that he 
shot her. (R. 264/112) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the 
right to a fair trial for a criminal defendant. The Defendant did not receive the 
effective assistance of counsel. The deficiencies in his representation deprived 
him of a fair trial, the results of which are reliable. 
Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to motion the 
court for a severance of the charges of attempted murder and possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person. The State was able to present evidence, and 
Defendant's attorney stipulated to the facts, that Defendant was a convicted 
felon, and he was on parole. There was no trial strategy involved in failing to 
move the court for a severance of the charges. Furthermore, the Defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficiencies in the representation. 
The victim was a crack addict who was intoxicated at the time of the 
incident. Furthermore, the victim denied having robbed the Defendant even 
though the Defendant told police that she had used force against him and they 
found several of his possessions at her cousin's home. Ed Martin, the victim's 
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cousin, and an eyewitness to the events told police conflicting stories and was in 
jail for theft at the time of the trial. 
Without evidence of Defendant's felony and parole status there's a 
reasonable likelihood that he would have received a more favorable result. For 
these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
convictions and remand the case to the district court for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is, "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
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defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part 
of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)) In making the 
determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider 
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
One of the charges against the Defendant was possession of a weapon by 
a restricted person, a second-degree felony. Defendant's counsel did not file a 
motion to sever the charges so the jury wouldn't hear that Defendant was a 
convicted felon and on parole. 
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In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[a] ruling on a motion to sever charges under Rule 9 is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent an 
abuse of discretion." Id. at 740. In Saunders, the Supreme Court addressed a 
situation where a defendant was charged with burglary, theft and possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person. The defendant's attorney filed a motion to sever 
the charges, which was denied by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that 
"the failure to sever the charges of possession of a firearm by a restricted person 
from the burglary and theft charges was an abuse of discretion." Id. at 740-41. 
In State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the defendant's attorney filed 
an untimely motion to sever the charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted 
person from a charge of aggravated assault. The case was reversed on other 
grounds, but in its opinion the Supreme Court gave a cautionary instruction to 
the trial court. The Court acknowledged that Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure justified the trial court's denial of the motion that was made 
on the second day of trial. The Court then stated that assuming that a timely 
motion was made on remand, "there seems to be no compelling reason to 
present the evidence of prior offenses to the jury that is trying the assault 
charges." Id. at 495. 
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In State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the defendant raised 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a 
motion to sever a charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted person from a 
charge of aggravated burglary. This Court opined that if his attorney had filed 
the appropriate motion under Rule 9 "the motion probably would have been 
granted." Id. at 958. Furthermore, this Court found that "in not making the 
motion, counsel's performance was deficient." Id. Nonetheless, this Court did 
not reverse because "[t]his mere allegation is insufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome, considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt on 
the theft and burglary charges:" Id. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure that the cases cited above 
relied on has been repealed. However, U.C.A. §77-8a-l now provides for a 
severance of charges if joining the charges would be prejudicial to the 
defendant. Subsection (4)(a) provides, "If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment 
or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election 
of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide 
other relief as justice requires." U.C.A. §77-8a-l(4)(a)(2005) 
This section clearly states that a court "shall" order separate counts if a 
defendant is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses. Based on prior Utah case law, 
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Defendant's trial counsel was clearly ineffective in failing to motion the court 
for a severance of the charges. Therefore, the first part of the Strickland test is 
met. Counsel's performance was deficient. There is no trial strategy involved 
in failing to sever the charges. Therefore, the second part of the Strickland test 
needs to be analyzed. That is, that Defendant was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance. 
In this case, the Defendant was prejudiced by the jury hearing that he was 
a convicted felon who was on parole. Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, these other acts are inadmissible. Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states that, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith." Subsection (b) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . ." U.R.E. 404(b) 
There is no non-character purpose to introduce to the jury that Defendant 
was a convicted felon who was on parole. In State v. Saunders, the Supreme 
Court stated that, u[b]ut for the joinder, evidence that defendant was at the time 
of the offenses committed to the Utah State Prison and living in a halfway house 
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would have been inadmissible at trial on the burglary and theft charges. This 
evidence clearly implied that defendant had committed a prior crime. The 
admissibility of such evidence is severely restricted under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." State v. Saunders, at 741. 
It was prejudicial to the Defendant to tell the jury that he was a convicted 
felon. There is no valid reason under Rule 404 to present that information to the 
jury. As the Supreme Court stated in Saunders, "[t]he basis of these limitations 
on the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder 
to convict the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown 
to be guilty of the offenses charged. Because of this tendency, such evidence is 
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Id. at 742. 
There is a strong possibility that the outcome for the Defendant would 
have been more favorable for him. The State's two main witnesses had 
credibility issues. The victim, by her own admission, had been using crack 
cocaine and drinking alcohol and was intoxicated at the time of the incident. 
Furthermore, it was apparent from the evidence that she wasn't being truthful in 
relation to whether or not she had stolen items from the Defendant's home. Ed 
1
 Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence was in effect at the time of trial in this 
case. That rule has been superseded by Rule 404 of the current Rules of 
Evidence which became effective September 1, 1983. 
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Martin gave conflicting stories to the police officers after the incident. It was 
impossible to know which version was correct. He was also in jail at the time of 
trial for a theft. (R. 163/124) 
The Defendant told the officers he was being assaulted when the shooting 
occurred. Without the prior bad act evidence there is a very real probability that 
the jury would have reasonable doubt concerning the Defendant's guilt and 
whether he intended to kill Felicia Chavez. 
The Defendant was prejudiced by the prior bad act evidence. The fact 
Defendant was a convicted felon and on parole was referred to during the 
prosecutor's opening statement, stipulated to by Defendant's own attorney, 
referenced throughout the trial, and re-emphasized during the prosecutor's 
closing argument. 
The errors complained of were highly prejudicial to the Defendant. They 
were so serious that they "deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." Strickland, at 687. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter 
back to the trial court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney failed to file a motion to sever the charges of attempted murder and 
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possession of a weapon by a restricted person. There was no legitimate trial 
strategy in not objecting to the cases being tried together. Furthermore, the 
Defendant was prejudiced by this information. The State's witnesses were not 
credible; and there is a reasonable probability that if the jury hadn't heard that 
Defendant was a convicted felon who was on parole, there would have been a 
more favorable outcome for the Defendant. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully moves this Court to reverse his convictions and remand the matter 
back to the trial court for a fair trial. 
DATED this 11th day of June 2007. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
EARNEST CHARLES FORD, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061900460 FS 
Judge: W BRENT WEST 
Date: November 22, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shannone 
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, STATE 
0619004(30 
CD19332784 
FORD.EARNEST CHARLES 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 7, 1954 
Video 
CHARGES 
ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH INJURY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/28/2006 Guilty 
PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 09/28/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
CD 
-c: 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present Tpn o 
custody of the Utah State Prison and represented by Roy Co\g,
 0' 
public defender. *# g 
Defense counsel argues that the sentences run concurrentlyPto ^he 
sentences that the defendant is currently serving, in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The State opposes concurrent sentencing and requests that this 
sentence run consecutive to any sentence that the defendant is 
currently serving. 
Defense counsel responds. 
The defendant addresses the Court. 
Page 1 
14S 
Case No: 061900460 
Date: Nov 22, 2006 
The defendant requests that he be permitted to file an appeal. 
Court grants request. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH INJURY 
a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These two sentences may run concurrently with each other but 
consecutively to any other sentence that the defendant is currently 
serving at the Utah State Prison. 
Restitution shall remain open for 30 days. 
The Court imposes an additional one year sentence for gun 
enhancement. This one year sentence shall run consecutive to the 
prison sentences imposed today. 
Dated this 2H day of W&*f(4w~ 20 ^ 
W BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. COUNSEL, NOW IS YOUR CHANCE 
TO MAKE ANY RECORD THAT YOU WANT TO MAKE IN REGARDS TO JURY 
SELECTION. ANY COMMENTS FOR THE RECORD? 
MR. LYON: NO. 
MR. COLE: NONE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN WE HAD A COUPLE ISSUES 
THAT HAVE COME UP AT SIDEBARS AND WE NEED TO MAKE A RECORD OF 
THAT. 
THE FIRST ISSUE DEALT WITH THE STATE'S REQUEST THAT THEY 
BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE JURY WITH THE FELONY THAT MR. FORD IS 
ON PROBATION OR PAROLE FOR WHICH RESULTS IN HIS RESTRICTED 
STATUS, AND WE TALKED ABOUT THAT. 
MR. LYON, WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE A RECORD ON THAT? 
MR. LYON: YES, YOUR HONOR. IT'S THE STATE'S 
POSITION THAT THAT EVIDENCE SHOULD COME IN. I DON'T SEE HOW 
THAT -- THE FACT THAT HE IS ON PAROLE FOR FELONY 
DISTRIBUTION, HOW THAT IS ANY MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN ANY OTHER 
FELONY THAT'S GOING TO COME OUT. I MEAN, THE STATUTE STATES 
THAT WE MUST PROVE THAT HE IS ON PAROLE FOR ANY FELONY, AND I 
THINK THAT THE JURY IS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT THE FELONY IS, 
AND THAT IS, IN FACT, A FELONY. I DON'T SEE HOW THE FACT 
THAT HE'S ON PAROLE FOP. DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IS ANY MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN ANY OTHER FELONY. 
THE COURT: MP. COLE? 
MR. COLE: YO*'R HONOR, IT'S MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN . " 
D Z 
IS PROBATIVE, BUT WE'LL STIPULATE THAT HE IS ON FELONY 
PROBATION AND WAS SO AT THE SAME TIME OF THIS OFFENSE. 
BEYOND THAT, IN ORDER TO GO THROUGH ALL THAT AND PROVE 
ALL THAT HE WANTS TO DO AND BRING IT IN, IT WOULD REQUIRE 
MORE THAN JUST WHAT WE'VE GOT HERE. HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO 
BRING IN PEOPLE FROM A.P.&P. INCLUDING THE PAROLE OFFICER AND 
ALL THAT STUFF, AND AT THAT POINT IT BECOMES LESS SEEKING 
JUSTICE THAN IT DOES A CIRCUS, SO I WOULD OBJECT IN THAT IT'S 
MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN IT IS PROBATIVE. 
THE COURT: AND MY ADVANCE RULING TO COUNSEL WAS I 
DID AGREE WITH THE DEFENSE, I THINK IT IS FAR MORE 
PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE. THE ISSUE IS HE'S A RESTRICTED 
PERSON BECAUSE HE'S ON PAROLE FOR A FELONY, THAT'S THE WAY 
THEY'VE WORDED IT IN THE STATUTE, HE'S WILLING TO STIPULATE 
THROUGH HIS ATTORNEY THAT HE WAS, IN FACT, ON PAROLE FOR A 
FELONY. 
NOW, OF COURSE, IF MR. FORD CHOOSES TO TESTIFY, THEN HE 
CAN BE ASKED QUESTIONS AND THAT VERY WELL MAY BECOME 
ADMISSIBLE. I ALSO FELT, QUITE FRANKLY, THEY'RE GOING TO BE 
ABLE TO GET IN NOT THE FACT THAT HE'S ON PAROLE FOR A 
SPECIFIC FELONY, BUT AS YOU INDICATED IN YOUR OPENING VOIR 
EIRE TO THE JUROR.-, WE'RE GOING TO HEAR FROM A LOT OF PEOPLE 
INVOLVING DRUGS AND THOSE KINDS OF THINGS, AND LIKE I SAID, : 
THINK IT'S -- IT'S THE FACT THAT HE'S ON A FELONY THAT MAKES 
H_M A RESTRICTED PERSON AND WHICH FELONY ~7 IS, I THINK THE": 
LEFT IT THAT WAY SO WE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT'S MORE 
PROBATIVE OR NOT, AND I FEEL IT'S FAR MORE PREJUDICIAL SO 
I'VE RULED THAT. 
THERE WAS ANOTHER ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED AS WELL. 
MR. COLE: AS TO THE — 
THE COURT: AS TO THE SIDEBAR UP HERE. YOU WERE 
BOTH HERE BEFORE WE STARTED AND I CAN'T REMEMBER WHAT IT WAS. 
MR. LYON: OH, IT WAS — 
THE COURT: OH, THE PICTURES, WE DEALT WITH THE 
PICTURES. YES. THE STATE HAD THREE PICTURES OF THE SAME 
DOOR THAT HAD BLOOD SPATTERS AND BLOODSTAINS AND MR. COLE 
WANTED TO LIMIT THAT TO ONE OR LESS. MR. LYON INDICATED THAT 
HE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH TWO. THE COURT FELT THAT THREE 
WAS OVERKILL, BUT I DID AGREE WITH THE STATE THE TWO PICTURES 
ARE APPROPRIATE. ONE FOCUSES ON THE SIZE OF THE BLOOD 
SPATTERS AND I THINK THAT THAT WAS RELEVANT AND PROBATIVE. 
AND THEN THE OTHER ONE SHOWED THE ENTIRE DOOR WHICH KIND OF 
SHOWS THE BLOODSTAIN OR BLOOD SPATTER WHICH I THOUGHT WAS 
RELEVANT AND I DID NOT FEEL THAT THEY WERE INFLAMMATORY. 
THIS THIRD PICTURE WAS JUST ANOTHER VERSION OF THE OTHER TWO, 
BUT I AGREE, I THINK MR. LYON TOOK US OFF THE HEAT BY SAYING 
HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE TWO. ALL RIGHT. 
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9? 
THE COURT: OH, YES. IN CHAMBERS BEFORE YOU BAISED 
THE ISSUE IN LIMINE ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE BULLETS THAT WERE 
FOUND AT MR. FORD'S RESIDENT NEITHER FIT NOR WERE THE RIGHT 
CALIBER FOR THE GUN THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY USED IN THIS 
PARTICULAR INSTANCE, AND YOU ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO GUN 
FOUND AT MR. FORD'S HOME. AND MR. LYON, AGAIN, TOOK US OFF 
THE HOOK THERE, HE SAID HE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF TRYING TO 
ADMIT THE BULLETS BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T RELEVANT. 
MR. LYON: I'M NOT GOING TO ADMIT THE BULLETS 
THEMSELVES BUT SOME OF THE OFFICERS WERE THERE DURING WHEN 
THEY SEARCHED THE HOME. ARE YOU MAKING A RULING THAT I CAN'T 
INDICATE THAT THEY FOUND BULLETS? BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THEY 
FOUND DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR SEARCH OF THE HOME I THINK 
THAT IS. 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK THAT THEY CAN TESTIFY THAT 
THEY FOUND BULLETS, BUT THEN I WOULD CLEARLY THINK THAT 
MR. COLE AND MR. FORD WOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION 
THAT THOSE WERE NOT BULLETS THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO THIS 
CASE. 
MR. COLE: AND IF THEY'RE NOT RELEVANT IN THAT 
CONTEXT, I THINK THEY'RE MORE PREJUDICIAL AND PROBATIVE 
AGAIN. 
THE COURT: NOW, ONCE AGAIN, THIS GETS INTO THE 
WORLD OF REALITY; THEY WERE SEARCHING, THEY WERE LOOKING I :<~ 
HEY ELIMINATE:. THOSE BULLETS AS NOT BEING INVOLVED BULLETS 
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REVOLVER. AND THERE WERE ALSO BULLETS FOUND AT THE 
DEFENDANT'S HOME, THOSE BULLETS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE 
BULLET THAT WAS FOUND AT THE CRIME SCENE. AND WE'LL BE 
ENTERING THIS REPORT INTO EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND THEN, MR. COLE, I BELIEVE YOU 
HAD A STIPULATION ON THE STATUS OF YOUR CLIENT AT THE TIME 
THAT THIS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED. 
MR. COLE: THE STIPULATION WE'VE ENTERED INTO IS 
THAT AT THE TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, MR. FORD WAS, IN FACT, 
ON PAROLE FOR A FELONY CONVICTION AND THAT THAT FELONY 
CONVICTION RENDERED HIM — 
THE COURT: A RESTRICTED PERSON. 
MR. COLE: — A RESTRICTED PERSON, UNABLE TO 
POSSESSION OR HAVE POSSESSION OR CONTROL OR USE OR PURCHASE 
OF ANY KIND OF WEAPON. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. AFTER THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN 
HEARD AND ARGUMENTS AND INSTRUCTIONS ARE -CONCLUDED, YOU WILL 
RETIRE TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE AND ARRIVE AT YOUR VERDICT. 
YOU WILL DETERMINE THE FACTS FROM ALL THE TESTIMONY YOU HEAR 
AND THE OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IS RECEIVED. 
(JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINUED.; 
THE COURT: SO I ASK THAT YOU NOW GIVE THE LAWYERS 
YOUR CLOSE ATTENTION AND I WILL RECOGNIZE THEM FOR PURPOSES 
OF OPENING STATEMENTS. 
MR. LVONV 
SIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT, AND THE DEFENDANT LEAVES. 
ED RUNS INSIDE THE HOME AND SEES FELICIA WHO HAD MANAGED 
TO WALK BACK TO THE FRONT OF THE HOME BACK INTO THE LIVING 
ROOM, AND THERE SHE WAS BLEEDING PROFUSELY. 9-1-1 HAD 
ALREADY BEEN CALLED. THE POLICE SHOWED UP, REQUESTED MEDICAL 
TO COME AND THEY WORKED ON FELICIA. AND AS THEY WERE LOADING 
HER UP AND TAKING HER OUT, ONE OF THE OFFICERS ASKS FELICIA, 
WHO DID THIS TO YOU? AND SHE SAYS, HALF-PINT. 
THEY TAKE HER UP TO THE HOSPITAL AND FELICIA OVER THE 
COURSE OF SEVERAL WEEKS AND MONTHS WAS IN THE HOSPITAL AND 
UNDERWENT NUMEROUS SURGERIES BECAUSE OF THIS GUNSHOT WOUND 
WHICH PIERCED HER ARM, EXITED HER ARM, PIERCED HER CHEST, 
RIPPED THROUGH HER BODY, SEVERING HER LIVER AND CAUSING 
EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO HER STOMACH. 
WELL, THE POLICE WENT ON THIS LEAD AND WENT AND TRIED TO 
FIND THE DEFENDANT. THEY CALLED ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
BECAUSE THEY KNEW HE WAS ON PAROLE. AND AGENTS WOODRING AND 
MOORE HAD BEEN TO HIS HOME PREVIOUSLY FOR A HOME CHECK, HE 
WASN'T THERE. THEY WENT TO HIS HOME, STARTED KNOCKING ON THE 
DOOR. NOTHING, NO RESPONSE. 
FINALLY, HE -- THERE'S SOMEONE THAT SAYS, WHO IS IT? 
THEY IDENTIFY THEMSELVES, ADULT PROBATION AMD PAROLE, OPEN UP 
EARNIE. THE DOOP DOESN'T OPEN, SO THEY START KICKING IT IN. 
THEY GIVE :: ABOR:T TWO GOOD KICKS AND IT'S ABOUT TO COME 
UNHINGE: :-.ND HE SAYS, I'M CDMING, I'M JOKING, KE OPENS UP 
ADDENDUM C 
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MR. COLE: THAT'S FINE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. COLE: NO OTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. LYON: NO. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY STAND DOWN. THANK YOU. 
MR. LYON: STATE CALLS AGENT JEFF MOORE. 
THE WITNESS: GOOD MORNING, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. 
JEFF MOORE, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LYON: 
Q. GOOD MORNING. 
A. MORNING. 
Q. COULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
A. AGENT JEFF MOORE. 
Q. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION, JEFF? 
201 A. I'M A PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
21 
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Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN DOING THAT? 
A. SIXTEEN YEARS. 
Q. AND WERE YOU WORKING ON JANUARY 2 5TH, 2 00 6? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. IN THE EARLY EVENING OF THE 25TH, DID YOU GO TO 3167 
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STEPHENS? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WHO RESIDES AT THAT RESIDENCE? 
A. MY PAROLEE, EARNEST FORD. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF GOING THERE IN THE EARLY EVENING? 
A. IT WAS A PAROLE HOME VISIT, CHECK UP, MAKE SURE HE WAS IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH HIS PAROLE. 
Q. IS THAT A STANDARD THING THAT YOU DO? 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. HOW OFTEN DO YOU DO THOSE CHECKS? 
A. ONCE, TWICE A MONTH. 
Q. THIS JUST HAPPENED TO BE HIS DAY? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SUPERVISING THE DEFENDANT? 
A. I HAD BEEN SUPERVISING EARNEST FOR ABOUT 60 -- 30, 60 
DAYS ON HIS CASE. 
Q. OKAY. AND JUST SO IT'S CLEAR, WHAT — WHAT DOES 
SOMEONE'S STATUS AS PAROLE MEAN? 
A. THAT MEANS THEY'RE COMING OUT OF PRISON OR CONVICTED 
FELON AND THEY HAVE TERMS SET BY THE BOARD OF PARDONS THEY 
HAVE TO COMPLY WITH. 
Q. OKAY. IT'S YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE SURE THEY'RE 
COMPLYING WITH THOSE TERMS? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN SUPERVISING THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO 
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THIS DAY? 
A. EXCUSE ME? 
Q. PRIOR TO THE 2 5TH OF JANUARY, ABOUT HOW LONG HAD YOU — 
A. THIRTY, 60 DAYS. 
Q. OKAY. 
61 A. IT WAS A NEW CASE TO ME. 
7 Q. YOU THE ORIGINAL PAROLE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO MR. FORD? 
8 A. I COULDN'T TELL WHO THAT WAS. 
9 Q. WERE YOU THE ORIGINAL — 
10 A. I WAS NOT --
11 Q. — AGENT --
12 A. I WAS NOT THE ORIGINAL; I WAS A TRANSFER. 
13 Q. OKAY. WHEN YOU WENT TO THE DEFENDANT'S HOME IN THE EARLY 
14 EVENING, WHAT DID YOU DO? 
15 A. KNOCKED ON THE DOOR. THERE WAS NO ANSWER. THERE WAS NO 
16 LIGHTS IN THE RESIDENCE. THERE WAS ANOTHER GENTLEMAN THAT 
17 LIVES IN FRONT OF THE APARTMENT. PRETTY STANDARD TRY TO MAKE 
18 SOME KIND OF CONTACT WITH SOMEBODY THERE TO SEE IF EARNEST IS 
19 STILL LIVING THERE, SEE IF THERE'S ANY PROBLEMS. SOMETIMES 
2 0 WE GET INFORMATION. WE KNOCKED ON THE DOOR. I SPOKE WITH 
21 HIS NEIGHBOR. THE NEIGHBOR UP FRONT TOLD ME EARNEST HAD JUST 
22 LEFT WITH ANOTHER PERSON, AND DIDN'T KNOW WHERE HE WAS GOING. 
23 Q. WERE YOU LATER CONTACTED THAT EVENING BY AN OFFICER TOM 
24 BREEN OF THE OGDEN POLICE? 
25 A. YES, SIR. 
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Q. 
A. 
WHY DID HE CONTACT YOU? 
HE CONTACTED ME AND MY SUPERVISOR, BLAKE WOODRING, 
ADVISING US EARNEST HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN INVOLVED IN A 
SHOOTING. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU HEARD THAT? 
LET ME ASK — STRIKE THAT. LET ME ASK YOU A BETTER 
QUESTION. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
ON 
YES, SIR. 
DID HE WANT TO MEET WITH YOU? 
YES, SIR. 
DID YOU GO AND MEET WITH OFFICER BREEN? 
YES, SIR. 
WHERE DID YOU MEET HIM? 
WE MET DOWN ON — I CAN'T REMEMBER THE PAINT COMPANY DOWN 
WALL. THERE'S A PAINT STORE THERE. 
Q. COULD IT HAVE BEEN KWAL'S? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. APPROXIMATELY THE 3100 BLOCK OF WALL? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WHAT DID THEY TELL YOU THERE? 
A. THEY INFORMED US, ADVISED US, THAT EARNEST ALLEGEDLY SHOT 
A FEMALE EARLIER IN THE EVENING AND HE WAS THE MAIN SUSPECT 
AND THEY WERE LOOKING FOR HIM. 
Q. WHERE DID YOU -- WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU HEARD THAT? 
A. WE --
